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CUIRTESY IN THE UNITED STATES
By GEORGE L. HASKINS "
I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
In England at common law a husband acquired upon marriage
a right to the rents and profits, together with the use and enjoyment,
of all the realty of which his wife was then seised and of which she
thereafter became seised during coverture.' The interest which he
thus acquired was known as an estate "by the marital right," or iure
uxoris. It was a life interest, measured by the joint lives of husband
and wife, which lasted until the dissolution of the marriage or until the
birth of issue, but it entitled him to no rights in her lands after her
death. Not until the birth of issue did the husband acquire rights
which he might assert in his wife's lands if he survived her. If issue
of the marriage, capable of inheriting her property, were born alive,
he then acquired in her inheritable estates of which she had actual
seisin an interest known as "curtesy initiate," a present estate measured
by his life alone.2 If he survived her, that interest became "consum-
mate;" and he was then said to be "tenant by the curtesy" during his
lifetime.' For most purposes there was no difference in the incidents
of curtesy initiate and of curtesy consummate.
Curtesy, therefore, was a life estate to which a husband was en-
titled tupon the birth of issue in all his wife's lands of which she had been
actually seised at any time during coverture, in fee simple or fee tail,
and to which issue of the marriage could inherit, provided such issue
t A.B. Harvard University, 1935; LL.B. Harvard University, 1942. Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Special Attorney, Legal Department,
The Pennsylvania Railroad Co. Author, THE STATUTE OF YORK (1935); THE
GROWTH OF EN&LISH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1948); The Defeasibility of
Dower, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 826 (1950) ; Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. REv.
1289 (1950) ; The Estate By the Marital Right, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345 (1949) ;
The Development of Comnwo Law Dower, 62 HA~v. L. REv. 42 (1948); various
articles in other legal periodicals.
1. See Haskins, The Estate By the Marital Right, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 345
(1949).
2. Co. Lrr=. *30 a.
3. Ibid.
4. The old authorities took the view that the wife's estate of inheritance was in
the husband after birth of issue and that his life estate therein did not arise until the
wife's death. See Farrer, Tenant By the Curtesy of England, 43 L.Q. REv. 87, 93-94
(1927). Thus, if, after birth of issue, the husband made a feoffment in fee, there
would be no forfeiture if he held by curtesy initiate; whereas, if his estate was by
curtesy consummate, there would be forfeiture. Co. LiTT. *30a. A further distinction
may be noted in connection with divorce. See Mattocks v. Stearns, 9 Vt. 326 (1837).
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had been born alive.5 The estate of curtesy which arose upon the birth
of issue differed from the estate by the marital right in two respects:
(1) it was an estate measured by the husband's life alone; (2) it at-
tached only to the wife's estates which were capable of inheritance by
issue of the marriage.' Curtesy was an interest analogous to dower
but differed from it in six principal respects: 7 (1) curtesy entitled the
husband to an estate in all the wife's inheritable freeholds, whereas
dower entitled the widow to an interest in only one-third of the hus-
band's; (2) actual seisin on the part of the wife was required for
curtesy, whereas seisin in law was sufficient for dower; (3) curtesy
attached to the wife's equitable as well as to her legal interests, whereas
dower was confined to the husband's legal estates; (4) a requirement
for curtesy was the birth of issue, whereas there was no such require-
ment for dower; (5) before the wife's death curtesy was a present
estate, whereas dower was only a protected expectancy before the hus-
band's death; (6) since curtesy attached to all the wife's lands, rather
than to a fractional share, there was no necessity for assignment, as in
the case of dower.
Curtesy made its appearance in the American colonies as early as
the seventeenth century.' Thereafter, with the gradual reception of
the English common law which took place in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, the principal features of common law curtesy be-
came an accepted part of the law of marital estates in several of the
original colonies and the first states.9 However, significant modifica-
tions of the common law requirements were made in the course of the
nineteenth century. In several states, for example, the strictness of the
rules with respect to the wife's actual seisin 10 and the birth of issue 11
were relaxed. The most important modification came about in the
second half of the nineteenth century as a result of the so-called Married
Women's Acts, giving a wife varying degrees of power to control and
dispose of her property during marriage.
5. For the history of curtesy in England, see Haskins, Curtesy at Common Law,
29 B.U.L. REv. 228 (1949).
6. Thus, curtesy attached to the wife's estates in fee simple, in fee tail general and
(if he were the spouse named) in fee tail special. LITTLETON, TENURES § 35.
7. For the characteristics of dower at common law, see Haskins, The Develop-
ment of Common Law Dower, 62 HARv. L. REV. 42 (1948).
8. Sniith v. Cheeseman (1673), Bowler's Case (1676), MINUTES OF COUNCIL AND
GEN. COURT oF COL. VA. 353, 450 (McIlwaine ed. 1924) ; Woodward V. Greenough
(1760), CoNN. PUB. REc. 1757-1762, 394-95 (Hoadly ed. 1880).
9. E.g., Laws of Md. 1809, c. 138, § 7; Laws of N.H. 1789, c. 42; Gale's Lessee
v. Houston (1795), 1 DEL. CASES 1792-1830, 375 (Boorstin ed. 1943). See, generally,
1 WoERNmR, AmRiCAN LAW OF AMnNIXsRATION § 121 (3rd ed. 1923).
10. Bush v. Bradley, 4 Day 298 (Conn. 1810); Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494
(1827) ; 4 KENT, Comm. *31; 1 CRuIsE, REAL PROPERTY *140 n. (Greenleaf ed. 1856).
11. PA. REv. STAT. c. 403, p. 504 (1846) ; W. VA. CoD § 15, p. 617 (1891).
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In the United States today curtesy in its common law form can
hardly be said to exist. In a large number of states all vestiges of
curtesy have been expressly abolished by statute.12  In other jurisdic-
tions, as a result of the Married Women's Acts just referred to, which
give a wife power to control and dispose of her property, it is generally
recognized that the husband can have no present -estate in his wife's
lands during the marriage." The effect of that legislation is therefore
to abolish by implication the principal features of the estate of curtesy
initiate. However, in many states, although curtesy during the wife's
life is abolished as a present estate, the husband has during marriage a
protected expectancy, similar to inchoate dower, which cannot be de-
feated by her sole act.' 4 Where such an interest is recognized, it cannot
be said that curtesy initiate has wholly disappeared.' 5
Curtesy consummate is still recognized substantially as at common
law in a small group of states.' In such states the husband is entitled
to a life estate in all lands of which his wife was seised during coverture
of an estate of inheritance, provided issue has been born alive.' 7  In a
second and larger group of states curtesy exists in modified form.
These states permit the surviving husband to claim a life estate in lands
of which the wife was seised during coverture,' s but they reduce his
interest to dower proportion '" or other fractional share,20 and in gen-
12. For a summary of such jurisdictions, see 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
538 et seq. (1935).
13. Pattison v. Baker, 148 Tenn. 399, 255 S.W. 710 (1923). Cases involving the
effect of these statutes are collected in Notes, 14 A.L.R. 355 (1921), 29, A..R.
1338 (1924).
14. Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 246 Mo. 711, 152 S.W. 38 (1912); Hackensack
Trust Co. v. Tracy, 86 N. J. Eq. 301, 99 Atl. 846 (1917). See also statutes cited in
notes 16 and 18 infra.
15. In Potter v. Steer, 95 N.J. Eq. 102, 122 Atl. 685 (1923), a judgment was
granted against a husband's "inchoate right of curtesy" but execution withheld until
his interest became consummate.
16. DEL. REV. CODE § 3731 (1935); N.H. REV. LAws c. 359, § 9 (1942); R.I.
GEN. LAWS c. 417, § 8 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8098, 8461 (Williams, 1934).
17. The requirement of birth of issue has been expressly recognized in Rhode
Island and Tennessee. Barlow v. Barlow, 49 R.I. 117, 140 At]. 467 (1928) ; Shearin
v. Shearin, 161 Tenn. 172, 29 S.W.2d 254 (1930). Delaware formerly required birth
of issue, but no longer requires it. Compare DEL. REV. CODE § 3267 (1915) with DEL.
REV. CODE § 3731 (1935). The New Hampshire statute provides merely that the
husband is entitled to curtesy "when he would be entitled to hold as tenant by the
curtesy at common law." N.H. REv. LAWS c. 359, § 9 (1942) ; Murdock v. Murdock,
74 N.H. 77, 65 At. 392 (1906).
18. HAW. REV. LAWS c. 292, § 12115 (1945); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art.
45, § 7 (1939); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 319
(1939) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 3:37-2 (1937) ; ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 17-401 (1940) ;
VA. CODE ANN. § 5139(a) (1942); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4096 (1949). In several
states the husband may waive his curtesy rights in favor of rights under the local
statute of descent. See VIII infra.
19. HAW. REv. LAWS c. 292, § 12115 (1945); Mn. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art.
45, § 7 (1939); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 189, § 1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 319
(1939) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 5139(a) (1942) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4096 (1949).
20. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3:37-2 (1937); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 17-401 (1940).
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eral they have no requirement of birth of issue." In a few of these
states his interest is termed "dower." 2 In nearly all the states of
these two groups the husband has a protected interest during cover-
ture, which is similar to inchoate dower, and which he cannot be
deprived of by her sole act.' The present article is principally concerned
with the husband's interest in the states of those two groups, and that
interest will be referred to as "curtesy." In a third group of states,
which purport to abolish curtesy, the husband is entitled to a specific
interest in fee which attaches, with certain exceptions, to realty of which
his wife was seised or possessed during coverture.24 Since these states
recognize and protect in the husband an inchoate interest during mar-
riage,25 many of the typical problems relating to curtesy arise in them,
and they are accordingly considered to that extent within the scope of
this article. A few jurisdictions, although describing the husband's
interest as "curtesy," confine his interest to lands as to which she died
intestate and permit the wife to defeat his interest by her sole con-
veyance. 26  There seems little justification for including those juris-
dictions in the groups which recognize some form of curtesy, and there
will be only occasional references to them in this article.
2 7
In the remaining jurisdictions in the United States-nearly one-
half of the states-curtesy has been completely abolished, either
expressly or impliedly.28 In those states the husband is either a mere
heir of his wife and shares only in case of intestacy,2 or he is a forced
heir of his wife and may dissent from her will and take an absolute
21. Express provisions to this effect are found in the statutes of New Jersey,
Oregon and West Virginia cited supra note 18.
22. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 41, § 1 (1935) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4096 (1949).
23. In Missouri the Married Women's Act has been construed to permit the
wife to defeat the husband's inchoate interest by her sole deed, despite the provision
giving a widower the same share in his wife's lands as she has in his. Scott v. Scott,
324 Mo. 1055, 26 S.W.2d 598 (1930).
24. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 1 (1935); IOWA CODE § 636.5, 636.21 (1950) ;
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-505 (Supp. 1945); ME. REV. STAT. c. 156, § 1 (1944);
MINN. STAT. § 525.16 (Henderson, 1949) ; NEE. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943). Compare
Indiana and Pennsylvania statutes cited in note 30 inf ra.
25. See references supra note 24.
26. ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 228, 229 (1947); D.C. CODE § 18-215 (1940);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-16 (1950); Wis. STAT. § 233.23 (1947).
27. What is said in IX infra with respect to the husband's interest after the wife's
death is in large measure applicable in these jurisdictions. It may also be noted that
the District of Columbia statute expressly requires birth of issue.
28. For a summary of these jurisdictions as of January 1, 1935, see 3 VERNMR,
AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 538-551 (1935).
29. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 113-902 (1933); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8906 (1942);
S.D. CODE § 56.0104 (1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 101-1-3, 4-5 (1943). In Connecticut
a surviving husband is entitled to a one-third interest for life in surplus realty and
personalty owned by his wife at death. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7309 (1949).
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share of the property owned by her at death." His rights in those
jurisdictions are considered only incidentally here."'
In a large number of American jurisdictions, including several of
those which retain some form of common law curtesy, the husband is
entitled upon his wife's death to a statutory share of her personal prop-
erty which is free from her testamentary control.3" The husband's
rights in his wife's personalty will not be considered."
II. REQUISITES OF CURTESY
In England at common law a husband was entitled to curtesy if
the three following conditions were met: (1) lawful marriage to the
woman in whose lands curtesy was claimed; (2) actual seisin in the
wife of an estate of inheritance to which issue of the husband might by
a possibility inherit; (3) birth of issue alive.34 He then had a present
estate known as "curtesy initiate," which would become "consummate"
if he survived her. In the United States, as a consequence of the Mar-
ried Women's Acts, curtesy initiate as such no longer exists, and there-
fore a fourth condition, the death of the wife, must be met before the
husband may claim curtesy or its statutory equivalent. Prior to his
wife's death, the husband has at most a protected expectancy similar to
inchoate dower. 3
Valid Marriage. The requirement of a valid marriage is a con-
sequence of the fact that curtesy arises by operation of law as a result
of the marriage relationship. If the marriage is void, curtesy does not
arise; if the marriage is voidable, it persists subject to defeasance if
annulled3 The validity of the marriage is normally determined by the
30. E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 176, §§ 1, 37 (1935); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-2321
(Bums, 1933); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-102 (1947); N.Y. DEC. EST. LAW
§§ 18, 83; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.2 (Supp. 1949). In Indiana and Pennsylvania
the interest to which the surviving husband is entitled receives incidental protection
during her lifetime by virtue of her incapacity to dispose of her real property without
his concurrence. IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-102 (Burns, 1933) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§32 (Supp. 1949).
31. See VIII infra.
32. For a summary of the husband's statutory rights in his wife's personalty, see
3 Vmuuma, Am- mcAN F~mrIy LAWS 538-551 (1935).
33. Ibid.
34. LiTTLETON, TENURES § 35.
35. For such jurisdictions, see note 14 supra. It should further be noted that at
common law a husband was denied curtesy in the lands of an alien wife. Foss v. Crisp,
20 Pick. 121 (Mass. 1838); Burk v. Brawn, 2 Atk. 397 (1742). Cf. Sharp v. St.
Sauveur, L.R. 7 Ch. 343 (1871) The disability of alienage has now been done away
with in most states. Lumb v. Jenkins, 100 Mass. 527 (1868) ; Cooke v. Doron, 215 Pa.
393, 64 Atl. 595 (1906). See 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 65-68, 159 n. 2 (6th ed.
1902). In a few states today the husband is not entitled to curtesy if his wife is a
nonresident. IoWA CODE § 636.8 (1950); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943). See
Decker, Dower and Curtesy of Non-Resident Spouse, 1 ORE. L. REv. 165 (1922).
36. Bruner v. Briggs, 39 Ohio St. 478 (1883) ; 1 CRUIsE, REAL PROPERTY 154
(Greenleaf ed. 1856). If the marriage is not annulled in the wife's lifetime, the
inchoate right becomes consummate, so that in that event a voidable marriage is
sufficient to support curtesy. STEWART, HUSBAND AND WIFE § 153 (1885).
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law of the place where contracted,3 7 but if local policy is against a par-
ticular type of marriage, such a marriage, though valid by the law of
the place where solemnized, may yet be invalid elsewhere. 8  Today
the problem of validity arises chiefly in connection with divorce, and it
gives rise to difficult questions.
As a general proposition, it may be said that the law of the situs
of land governs the husband's right of curtesy.8 9 If a valid divorce is
granted in the state where the parties are domiciled, it is usually held
that the husband loses all rights to curtesy in lands located in that state
or elsewhere, unless his right is preserved by statute.4 Hence, if the
ex-wife remarries, her second husband will be entitled to curtesy
wherever the second marriage is valid. 41 If the divorce is granted in a
jurisdiction other than where the land is situated, certain conflict of
laws problems arise. Most courts seem to have held that a valid divorce
cuts off the husband's right of curtesy whether the divorce was secured
within or without the state.4' A foreign divorce must be accorded full
faith and credit, and it now seems that such a divorce may be challenged
only on the -ground that the court granting the decree had no jurisdic-
tion.43  If both parties were present at the divorce proceedings and the
question of jurisdiction was litigated, or if there was full opportunity to
contest the jurisdictional issue, the question is res judicata and may
not be subjected to a collateral attack.44 In effect, only ex parte divorces
may be contested elsewhere. But it is still uncertain just what full faith
and credit for a foreign decree means with respect to curtesy.45  It
seems possible that a state may recognize a foreign divorce as ending
the marital relationship and yet at the same time refuse to recognize it
as necessarily affecting every other legal incident of that marriage.4"
37. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 351-355 (3rd ed. 1949).
38. Thus, miscegenous marriages, valid in many states, are not recognized in
several jurisdictions. State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877) ; State v. Bell, 66 Tenn.
9 (1872). Contra, Inhabitants of Medway v. Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass.
157 (1819); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). See 1 VERNmR,
A~MERCAN FAMmLY LAws 204-205, 209-213 (1931).
39. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 424 (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATEMFNT, CONFLICrS
§248(2) (1934).
40. Ibid. See Barrett v. Failing, 111 U.S. 523 (1884) (dower).
41. If the state of domicile which granted the divorce prohibits remarriage by
the wife within a specified period of time, what will be the effect of her remarriage
in another state within that period? Analogous cases relating to dower suggest that
such marriage will usually be regarded as valid in the state of domicile for purposes
of permitting the second husband to claim curtesy in lands located in the latter state.
Loth v. Loth's Estate, 54 Colo. 200, 129 Pac. 827 (1913) ; Putnam v. Putnam, 8 Pick.
433 (Mass. 1829). Contra, Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N.E. 222 (1912);
Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787 (1908).
42. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 424-425 (3rd ed. 1949).
43. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
44. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
45. See Mr. Justice Jackson's dissent in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948).
46. Estin v. Estin, note 45 supra. For a recent discussion of this conception of
divisible divorce, see Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1287 (1951).
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A number of states have statutes which specifically prescribe the
effect of divorce on curtesy, but space does not permit detailed discus-
sion of the varying approaches which states have followed in construing
such statutes with respect to foreign divorces.
47
Seisin. As to the requirement of seisin, it was well-established at
common law that a husband was entitled to curtesy only in those lands
of which his wife was solely and beneficially seised, at some time during
coverture, of an estate of inheritance to which issue of the marriage
might succeed.4 ' The requirement of seisin meant that the husband
might have curtesy only in those estates which had vested in possession
during the marriage, so that he was denied curtesy in remainders and
reversions which had not so vested.49  As previously stated, actual
seisin in deed was required, unless the acquisition of such seisin was
legally impossible.8 The time of acquisition of seisin was unimportant,
provided it was at some time during coverture 1 Curtesy attached to
his wife's estates in fee simple, in fee tail general and (if he were the
spouse named) in fee tail special. 2 Although a widow was not per-
mitted dower in equitable estates,5" a contrary rule was recognized with
respect to curtesy, so that the husband was entitled to curtesy out of
his wife's equitable estates under circumstances similar to those which
gave rise to curtesy at law.54
In the United States, the foregoing rules with respect to seisin have
been generally accepted in those jurisdictions where some form of cur-
tesy continues to be recognized,55 except that the requirement of actual
seisin has been largely dispensed with. Only a few modern cases have
required an entry by the wife in order to entitle the husband to curtesyr 6
47. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 568-570 (1935).
48. Co. LIT. *30a.
49. Co. LIrr. *29a.
50. Eager v. Furnivall, 17 Ch. D. 115 (1881). Physical impossibility was not
considered an excuse.- PERKINS, PROFITABLE Boox § 470 (1586). The origin of this
curious rule seems to lie in a sentiment favoring family stability. The husband had
curtesy only in what the child, had he lived long enough, could have seen his father
enjoying; of that the child was not permitted to deprive his father. See Farrer,
Tenant by the Curtesy of England, 43 L.Q.R. 87 (1927).
51. 2 BI. Comm. *128.
52. LlrrLErox, TENURES § 35. If he were a second husband, he would have no
curtesy in lands given to his wife and the heirs of her body by her first husband,
Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. I, c. 1.
53. CHALLIS, REAL PROPERTY 346 (3rd ed.:1911); MAITLAND, EQUITY 114 (1909).
Lord Mansfield pointed out in the mid-eighteenth century that the refusal of dower in
equitable estates was not based upon reason but had come about because the prior
"wrong determination had misled in too many instances to be now altered and set
right." Burgess v. Wheate, 1 W.BI. 123, 160 (1759).
54. Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wins. 108 (1708) (trust); Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk.
603 (1737) (equity of redemption).
55. See 1 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 154-155 (Greenleaf ed. 1856).
56. Hackensack Trust Co. v. Tracy, 86 N.J. Eq. 301, 99 Atl. 846 (1917) ; Carr v.
Anderson, 6 App. Div. 6, 39 N.Y. Supp. 746 (1896). In Carr v. Anderson, supra,
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and it is now widely held that seisin in law is sufficient." Thus, it may
be said that in most jurisdictions recognizing some form of curtesy
the wife is sufficiently seised if she has actual possession of a freehold
estate 58 or if she is entitled to possession of such an estate by descent,
devise, or deed. Actual entry is required, however, if, at the time she
becomes entitled, the land is in the adverse possession of another.59 On
the ground that there can be no seisin of future estates of freehold,
curtesy is denied in remainders, reversions and other future interests
which have not vested in the wife's lifetime.6  However, since the
owner of such an interest following a term for years is regarded as
having seisin,0 ' curtesy attaches to reversions and remainders which are
subject to a term."' Since the owner of a term is not seised, the hus-
band has no curtesy in his wife's leasehold interests,' but that rule
has been modified by statute in an occasional jurisdiction.64 As in the
corresponding case of dower, it is required that the wife's seisin be sole,
so that curtesy does not attach to lands held by the wife in joint tenancy
with another or others.0 5 Following the English rule, curtesy attaches
to the wife's equitable estates of inheritance,66 including sole and sepa-
rate use trusts, 7 so that today ownership of an equitable interest is
the court confined the rule to cases in which the wife takes by inheritance and stated
that it had no application to cases in which she took by deed or by will.
57. Mettler v. Miller, 129 Ill. 630, 22 N.E. 529 (1889) ; Tyndall v. Tyndall, 186
N.C. 272, 119 S.E. 354 (1923). Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 5139a (1942) ("seized in fact
or in law").
58. The wife's adverse possession for a period shorter than that required by the
statute of limitations is sufficient seisin for curtesy to attach. Rochon v. Lecatt, 1
Stew. 609 (Ala. 1828). See Coglan v. Pelleris, 48 N.J.L. 27, 32, 2 Atl. 633, 635
(1886).
59. Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793 (1848) ; Parsons v. Justice, 163 Ky. 737, 174
S.W. 725 (1915) ; Den v. -Demarest, 21 N.J.L. 525 (1848); Baker v. Oak-ood, 49
Hun 416, 3 N.Y. Supp. 570 (1888) ; Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129 (1880). Contra,
Borland's Lessee v. Marshall, 2 Ohio St. 308 (1853).
60. Todd v. Oviatt, 58 Conn. 174, 20 Atl. 440 (1889) ; Moore v. Newsom, 244 Ky.
333, 50 S.W.2d 945 (1932); Ferguson v. Tweedy, 43 N.Y. 543 (1871); Hitner v.
Ege, 23 Pa. 305 (1854). Contra, Snyder v. Jones, 99 Md. 693, 59 Atl. 118 (1904).
61. Co. Lrrr. *29.
62. Carter v. Williams, 43 N.C. 177 (1851); Lowry's Lessee v. Steele, 4 Ohio
170 (1829); 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 151 (6th ed. 1902).
63. 4 KENT, Comm. *30 and cases there cited.
64. MAss. GEN. LAws c. 186, § 1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 318, 319
(1939).
65. Co. Lrrr. *183a. See Davis v. Bass. 188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924). If
the wife holds as a tenant-in-common or coparcener, the husband is entitled to curtesy.
Wass v. Bucknam, 38 Me. 356 (1854). Contra, McNeeley v. South Penn. Oil Co.,
52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1903) (construing Married Women's Act).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 5139a (1942). Meacham v. Bunting, 156 Ill. 586. 41 N.E.
175 (1895) ; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 528 (1868) ; Templeton v. Twitty, 88
Tenn. 595, 14 S.W. 435 (1890). See Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256, 18 Atl. 1017
(1889). In Kentucky, curtesy attaches to equitable interests owned by the wife at
death. Ky. REv. STAT. §§392.010,-.040 (1948).
67. Cushing v. Blake, 30 N.J. Eq. 689 (1879); Travis v. Sitz, 135 Tenn. 156,
185 S.W. 1075 (1916). If the instrument creating the trust expressly excludes
curtesy, equity will give effect to the terms of the trust. Wood v. Reamer, 118 Ky.
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usually the equivalent of seisin at law for purposes of curtesy. 8 As in
the analogous case of dower, 9 American courts require that the wife's
seisin be beneficial; 70 therefore, when legal title is in the wife as tFustee
or mortgagee,71 or if she is a mere conduit of title,72 her husband will
not be entitled to curtesy. If the other requisites of curtesy are complied
with, the time at which the wife becomes seised is immaterial, provided
it be during coverture. Thus, the husband has been held entitled to
curtesy in lands of which the wife was seised before the birth of issue
provided the required issue was subsequently born.
7 8
Birth of Issue. The third requisite for curtesy at common law was
the birth of issue of the marriage. Birth of issue was not required in
order to entitle a woman to dower. The reasons for its being required
in the case of curtesy seem to have been connected with ideas of guard-
ianship which the writer has discussed elsewhere.74  The persistence
of the requirement into the modern period can be explained only in
terms of the rigor with which the common law judges continued to
apply many old rules which had lost their original raison d'etre. It
was required that the child be legitimate,7 and that it be born alive in
the life of its mother,76 but the immediate death of the child did not
affect the husband's right to curtesy established by its birth. The
841, 82 S.W. 572 (1904) ; Chapman v. Price, 83 Va. 392, 11 S.E. 879 (1886). Most
cases hold that the husband is entitled to curtesy even when he creates the trust
in her favor. Hughes v. Saffell, 134 Ky. 175, 119 S.W. 804 (1909); Cushing v.
Blake, supra. Contra, Ratliff v. Ratliff, 102 Va. 880, 47 S.E. 1007 (1904). Cases are
collected in Notes, 69 L.R.A. 353, 375 (1906), 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 776 (1910), 30
A.L.R. 1057 (1924).
68. It has been held in Nebraska that a wife's interest as vendee under a'contract
of sale is insufficient to entitle her husband to curtesy when the entire payment has not
been made and her equity is therefore "incomplete." Grandjean v. Beyl, 78 Neb. 349,
110 N.W. 1108 (1907).
69. See 1 ScRIBNER, DOWER 278-279 (2d ed. 1883).
70. 4 KENT, Comm. *32; 1 WAsHmRm, REAL PROPERTY 154 (6th ed. 1902).
71. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3:37-3 (1937) ; Chew v. Southwark, 5 Rawle 159 (Pa.
1835) ; 4 KENT, Comm. *32.
72. E.g., in the case of a purchase-money mortgage. See note 190 infra.
73. Comer v. Chamberlain, 6 Allen 166 (Mass. 1863). See 2 BL. Comm. *128.
If the wife acquires seisin after the death of the child, the husband will be entitled to
curtesy. Donovan & Boyd v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149, 114 S.W. 621 (1908). Early
authorities are collected in Note, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 825 (1909).
74. Haskins, Curtesy at Conwn Law, 29 B.U.L. REv. 228, 231-232 (1949). In
many systems of marital law the birth of a child, even though its speedy death follows,
has important consequences for both husband and wife. See Brunner, Die Geburt
eines lebenden Kindes, 16 ZErrsCanaw DER SAYIGNY-STUrNrG, GERMANISTICHE
AmELUNG 63 (1895).
75. Although by canon law a child might be legitimated by a subsequent mar-
riage, such a child was not regarded by the temporal courts as legitimated for pur-
poses of succession to English land. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND 53-56 (1898).
76. 2 BL. Comm. *127. Birth by caesarian operation after the wife's death was
held insufficient to give curtesy to the husband. Ibid.; Co. Lrrr. *29b.
77. LrrrLToi, TENURES § 35; Co. LIr. *30a. The husband would also be en-
titled to curtesy in lands which the wife acquired after the child's death and during
the subsistence of the marriage. -2 BL., Comm. *128.
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condition that the child be born alive was ordinarily satisfied by testi-
mony that it had been heard to cry.7" In the United States, the re-
quisite of birth of issue has been generally abandoned, but it still sur-
vives in two or three states.79  Where birth of issue has been recognized
as a condition precedent to curtesy, the common law requirements have
generally been insisted upon."0 Although as at common law the adop-
tion of a child will not give rise to curtesy,8 ' the legitimation after mar-
riage of a child born to the parties theretofore has been held sufficient
to entitle the husband to curtesy.8 2
As previously stated, the death of the wife is now universally re-
quired in this country in order for the husband to be entitled to an
estate of curtesy.s Prior to her death, however, he usually has a pro-
tected interest which arises when the other conditions required for
curtesy have been complied with. 4
III. PROPERTY AND INTEREST SUBJECT TO CURTESY
Curtesy, like dower, attaches to lands and teneme0ltsS5 of which
the wife has the requisite seisin during coverture " and to which issue
of the marriage may by a possibility succeed.37 Thus, a husband may
78. Y.B. 20-21 Edw. I (Rolls Ser. 1866) 39 (1292); Lrlrorxw, TENURES, § 35.
79. Barlow v. Barlow, 49 RI. 117, 140 Atl. 467 (1928); Shearin v. Shearin,
161 Tenn. 172, 29 S.W.2d 254 (1930). Cf. N.H. REv. LAws c. 359, § 9 (1942).
80. Birth alive in the wife's lifetime: Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige 35, 42
(N.Y. 1830). Proof of birth alive by crying or other sufficient evidence of .life:
Doe v. Killen, 5 Houst. 14 (Del. 1875) ; Goff v. Anderson, 91 Ky. 303, 15 S.W. 866
(1891); In re Stuertz's Estate, 124 Neb. 149, 245 N.W. 412 (1932); Fleming v.
Sexton, 172 N.C. 250, 90 S.E. 247 (1916). Subsequent death of child does not bar
curtesy: Donovan v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149, 114 S.W. 621 (1908) ; Travis v. Sitz, 135
Tenn. 156, 185 S.W. 1075 (1916).
81. Murdock v. Murdock, 74 N.H. 77, 65 Atl. 392 (1906).
82. Hunter v. Whitworth, 9 Ala. 965 (1846). Contra, Bond v. Bond, 16 Va.
L. Reg. 411 (Va. Circ. Ct., Pulaski Co. 1910). See Note, 24 HARv. L. REv. 146
(1910).
83. Sadler v. Campbell, 150 Ark. 594, 236 S.W. 588 (1921) ; Duncan v. Duncan,
324 Mo. 167, 23 S.W.2d 91 (1929); Hackensack Trust Co. v. Tracy, 86 N.J. Eq.
301, 99 Atl. 846 (1917).
84. In Matter of Lindewall, 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942), it was held that
the husband's civil death, resulting from sentence to life imprisonment, terminates all
property interests in the estate of his later dying spouse. For the effect of civil death
generally, see Note, 139 A.L.R. 1308 (1942).
85. LirnxToN, TENURES § 52; 2 BL., Comm. *126. The word "tenements" used
in connection with curtesy seems to have included rights issuing out of or annexed to
corporeal inheritances capable of actual seisin. Thus, at common law a husband might
have curtesy in a rent-charge, an advowson in gross, a fair, a bailiwick, and the like.
PERKINS, PROFITABLE BooK §§459 et seq. ((1586).
In Maine a husband is not entitled to a share in the wild lands of which the wife
was seised during coverture, even if they were cleared in her lifetime; but curtesy
does attach to wild lands of which the wife dies seised. ME. REv. STAT. c. 156, § 1
(1944).
86. See generally, II supra.
87. LIrNEToN, TENURES § 52.
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have curtesy in his wife's estates in fee simple, in fee tail general and
(if he is the spouse named) in fee tail special."8 Curtesy is not per-
mitted in estates held by his wife for her life. 9 Although an estate
pur autre vie will not necessarily terminate at the wife's death, curtesy
is also denied in all such life estates.' The requirement of seisin limits
curtesy to freehold interests, and curtesy is consequently excluded from
leasehold estates of which the owner cannot be seised.'
As previously stated, curtesy attaches to the wife's equitable
estates under circumstances similar to those which give rise to curtesy
at law. 2 Curtesy also attaches to an equity of redemption owned by the
wife during coverture, 3 and to an equitable interest under a contract of
sale.94 The interest may also attach to the surplus produced by the
foreclosure of a mortgage superior to curtesy,95 to the proceeds of a sale
which retain the character of realty,"8 and to money which is directed
to be laid out in land.
97
The husband's rights in his wife's mortgaged property generally
follow the principles outlined by the writer elsewhere in connection with
dower," and most of that discussion is accordingly applicable to cur-
tesy. Thus, if a wife executes a mortgage during coverture, or if, before
or during marriage, she acquires property already encumbered by a
mortgage, her husband's inchoate right will attach to such property as
against all but the mortgagee and those claiming under him.9 If the
wife executes a mortgage upon her land during coverture, her husband's
88. Chilton v. Chilton, 217 Ky. 258, 289 S.W. 275 (1926) ; LrrrLEToN, TENURES
§35; 1 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 161-162 (Greenleaf ed. 1856).
If lands are exchanged by the wife, the widower must usually elect the tract in
which he wishes to claim curtesy. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 17 (1935) ; ORE. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 17-102,-401 (1940).
89. Gray v. Clement, 296 Mo. 497, 246 S.W. 940 (1922) ; Waller v. Martin, 106
Tenn. 341, 61 S.W. 73 (1901).
90. Folwell v. Folwell, 65 N.J. Eq. 526, 56 Atl. 117 (1903).
91. See Note, 11 L.R.A. 825, 826 (1891) ; 4 KENT, Comm. *30, and cases there
cited. A contrary rule is occasionally recognized by statute. E.g., MASS. GEN.
LAWS c. 186, § 1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 318, 319 (1939).
92. See II'supra.
93. Jackson v. Becktold Printing & Book Mfg. Co., 86 Ark. 591, 112 S.W. 161
(1908) ; Robinson v. Lakenan, 28 Mo. App. 135 (1887).
94. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 1 (1935) ;- Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 392.010,-.040 (1948);
Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §321 (1939). Contra, Grandjean v. Beyl, 78 Neb. 349, 110
N.W. 1108 (1907).
95. See authorities cited in notes 101, 104 and 105 infra.
96. Houghton v. Hapgood, 13 Pick. 154 (Mass. 1832); Mullen v. Mullen, 98
N.J. Eq. 90, 129 Atl. 749 (1925) ; In re Camp, 126 N.Y. 377, 27 N.E. 799 (1891);
Deffenbaugh v. Hess, 225 Pa. 638, 74 Atl. 608 (1909).
97. McDaniel v. Grace, 15 Ark. 465 (1855). See 1 CRUISE, REAL PROPERTY 164
(Greenleaf ed. 1856).
98. Haskins, Dower in Mortgaged Property, 5 MIAmi L.Q. 187 (1951).
99. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 3 (1935); ORE. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 17-103,-401 (1940).
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rights are usually superior to ,the claim of the mortgagee, unless he
releases his inchoate right by joining in the mortgage.' In the latter
event, the husband is entitled to curtesy, but his claim is subject to the
right of the mortgagee and those claiming under him.'' If during
coverture a wife buys realty and gives back to the vendor a purchase-
money mortgage by way of security, the mortgage lien is superior to
curtesy, whether or not the husband joins in the giving of the mort-
gage.'0 2 If property is sold after the wife's death to satisfy an encum-
brance superior to curtesy, the widower is usually entitled to curtesy
in the surplus proceeds.'0 3  Although there is some authority to the
effect that, if foreclosure takes place in the wife's lifetime, the husband's
right in the wife's equity of redemption will be protected by transferring
his interest to a fund of the surplus established for his benefit, 0 4 it is
more generally held that under those circumstances the surplus is per-
sonal property which belongs to the wife free of the husband's inchoate
curtesy.' 05
Curtesy, like dower, may be claimed in mines and quarries ... and
in oil wells,' 0 7 but, as in the case of dower, curtesy will be denied in
mines or in wells which were not opened in the wife's lifetime.'08 Cases
in which curtesy has been claimed in partnership property have seldom
arisen,' O9 but it is clear that in jurisdictions which have adopted the
Uniform Partnership Act "1' land acquired with partnership funds is
not subject to curtesy."'
In most jurisdictions where curtesy in some form is recognized,
the husband's interest attaches to lands which he conveys to his wife,
100. See note 190 inifra.
101. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 5 (1935). As to the husband's right to re-
deem, see 2 JoNEs, MORTGAGES § 1366 (8th ed. 1928).
102. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. C. 41, § 4 (1935); MASS. GEm. LAWS c. 189, §2
(1932); MiNN. STAT. § 507.03 (Henderson, 1949); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN.
§§ 17-104,-401 (1940).
i03. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 5 (1935); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 17-105,401 (1940).
104. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 4099 (1943).
105. In Kentucky the husband is entitled to curtesy in the surplus unless dis-
posed of by the wife. Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 392.010,-.040 (1948).
106. Deffenbaugh v. Hess, 225 Pa. 638, 74 Atl. 608 (1909); Alderson's Adm'r
v. Alderson, 46 W. Va. 242, 33 S.E. 228 (1899).
107. Cases are collected in Note, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1099, 1108 (1912).
108. Barnsdall v. Boley, 119 Fed. 191 (N.D. W. Va. 1902). For further dis-
cussion see Note, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1099, 1108-1110 (1912).
109. See Note, 27 L.R.A. 340 (1895).
110. Analogous decisions relating to dower are presumably applicable. See Note,
25 A.L.R. 389 (1923).
111. UNrFOR PARTNERSHip Act §25(e).
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either directly or through a third person," 2 unless the language of the
deed indicates an intention to divest him of any interest therein." 3
IV. DEFEASIBILITY OF WIFE'S INTEREST
Provided that the requisites for curtesy have been satisfied, the
husband's interest attaches to the wife's property notwithstanding the
fact that her estate is subject to conditions and restrictions. Like
dower, curtesy has usually been regarded as a derivative interest
which depends upon the estate of the wife and cannot rise higher than
its source." 4  Hence, in most situations, the husband's inchoate right
and his estate after her death are subject to the same defects and limita-
tions existing in the wife's estate at the time his interest attached.
Thus, if the wife's title is defective, the husband's interest is defeasible
to one having the interest which constitutes the defect." 5 Similarly,
curtesy may be defeated or impaired by the assertion of an outstanding
vendor's lien which attached to the land before or during marriage." 6
If the wife's estate is subject to a special limitation '7 or to a right of
entry for condition broken,"" the husband's estate is terminable upon
the same terms as her own estate.
As in the corresponding case of dower, there are certain situations
in which the courts have not adhered to the conception of curtesy as a
derivative interest. Although the soundness of their holdings seems
open to question, the decided cases are all but unanimous in stating that
curtesy is unaffected by the expiration of the wife's estate " 9 or by the
termination thereof by an executory limitation. 2 ' Those holdings have
been roundly criticized by the Restatement of Property 121 on the ground
that in every other situation curtesy is regarded as a provision for the
112. Cases are collected and discussed in Note, 30 A.L.R. 1057 (1924).
113. Rautenbusch v. Donaldson, 13 Ky. L. Rep.'752, 18 S.W. 536 (1892) ; Rigler
v. Cloud, 14 Pa. 361 (1850).
114. For an extended discussion of the problems relating to defeasibility, see
Haskins, The Defeasibility of Dower, 98 U. OF PA. L. REV. 826 (1950).
115. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY App. 2 (1936); 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY
147-148 (6th ed. 1902).
116. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY App. 2 (1936).
117. See Carter v. Couch, 157 Ala. 470, 47 So. 1006 (1908). Cases are col-
lected in Note, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 858 (1909).
118. 4 KENT, COmm. *33; 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY App. 4 n.8 (1936); 1
WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 147-148 (6th ed. 1902).
119. Holden v. Wells, 18 R.I. 802, 31 Atl. 265 (1895).
120. Cooper's Adm'r v. Clarke, 192 Ky. 404, 233 S.W. 881 (1921); Buckworth
v. Thirkell (1785), reported in note to Doe v. Hutton, 3 Bos. & P. 643, 652 et seq.
(C.P. 1804), 1 Collectanea Juridica 332 (Hargrave ed. 1791); Hatfield v. Sneden,
54 N.Y. 280 (1873). The foregoing cases involve executory interests, but the prin-
ciple has been applied in the case of the exercise of a power appendant. See Archer
v. Urquhart, 23 Ont. 214 (1893).
121. 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY App. 3 (1936).
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widower out of the assets of the deceased spouse and that he is entitled
to a share of what his wife had, no more and no less."m
V. EXTENT OF THE INTEREST
At common law, the husband's curtesy was a life estate in all his
wife's estates in fee simple and fee tail of which she had the requisite
seisin ' 23 and to which issue of the marriage might by a possibility
succeed. A few American jurisdictions permit the husband to claim an
interest of similar extent,124 but more commonly his life estate is reduced
to dower proportion 125 or other fractional share. 26 Several states
which purport to abolish curtesy, but which are nevertheless considered
within the scope of this article,2 T give the husband a specified interest
in fee which attaches, with certain exceptions, to realty of which his
wife was seised or possessed during coverture.'28 In most jurisdictions
in which the husband has an inchoate interest during marriage, that
interest cannot be defeated by the wife's creditors during coverture or
after her death'2 9
In jurisdictions which have* effectually abolished all vestiges of
curtesy, the husband is generally entitled to take as forced heir a stat-
utory substitute frequently patterned on the local intestacy statute.
Those statutes are not considered within the scope of this article, and
in any event they are too varied and too complex to render classifica-
tion of much value.'31 His interest under such statutes is usually sub-
ject to the claims of his wife's creditors.
VI. THE INTEREST BEFORE WIFE'S DEATH
At common law curtesy initiate was a present estate,'8 ' measured
by the husband's own life and extending to all lands of which his wife
122. Cf. McMasters v. Negley, 152 Pa. 303, 25 Ati. 641 (1893). The pertinent
authorities are discussed in Hasldns, The Defeasibility of Dower, 98 U. OF PA. L.
Ray. 826, 832-839 (1950).
123. See II upra.
124. DEL. REV. CODE § 3731 (1935); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 359, § 9 (1942); R.I.
GEN. LAWS c. 417, § 8 (1938); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8098, 8461 (Williams, 1934).
125. E.g., ILT. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 1 (1935) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 392.010 (1948);
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189 § 1 (1932) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4096 (1949).
126.- NJ. RZEv. STAT. § 3:37-2 (1937) (one-half),; ORE. Coup. LAWS ANN.
§ 17-401 (1940) (one-half).
127. See note 24 supra.
128. IOWA CODE §§ 636.5,-.21 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-505 (Supp.
1945); ME. REv. STAT. c. 156, § 1 (1944); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943).
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 236, § 55 (1932); ME. REv. STAT. c. 156, § 9 (1944).
In four states, the husband is not entitled to a statutory share in lands sold on exe-
cution or judicial sale. IOWA CODE § 636.5 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-108
(1935); MINN. STAT. § 525.16 (2) (Henderson, 1949); NEB. REv. STAT. §30-101
(1943). At common law this matter was of relatively slight importance because of
the wife's general incapacity to contract obligations during coverture.
130. For a convenient summary of such statutes, see 3 VERNIER, AmZaIcAN
FAmILy LAWS 538-552 (1935).
131. See text at note 2 supra.
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had or might acquire the requisite seisin during coverture. He was
entitled to -the use and occupation of the property to which his interest
attached, together with all the rents and profits of the same."32 He
might convey it or encumber it,"~ and it was subject to execution for
his debts., 4 His interest during coverture was basically different from
the wife's corresponding right of inchoate dower, which was merely a
protected expectancy and not a present estate.
As already stated, in the United States the Married Women's Acts
of the nineteenth century had the effect of abolishing by implication cur-
tesy initiate as a present estate.'3 5 In several jurisdictions, however,
those acts were interpreted to mean that the husband had during
coverture a protected expectancy similar to inchoate dower; 136 in other
jurisdictions, statutes expressly created such an expectancy by their
specifications of the interest to which he was entitled upon his wife's
death.3 Where the husband has before his wife's death a protected
expectancy which is similar to inchoate dower,3 8 that expectancy arises
upon the concurrence of marriage, seisin and (where required) birth of
issue.' 9 The interest is not an estate in land, and the husband cannot
convey, assign or mortgage it. 4 ' Yet it is a property right having a
present value, and, with few exceptions considered hereafter,' 4' the
husband cannot be deprived of it while the marriage endures, unless
he consents thereto or predeceases his wife.1' Although he cannot
132. Niel v. Johnson, 11 Ala. 615 (1847); Shortall v. Hinckley, 31 Ill. 219
(1863). Cf. Foster v. Marshall, 22 N.H. 491 (1851). The birth of issue effected
no substantial change in the incidents of the estate iure uxoris. See note 4 supra.
133. Boykin v. Rain, 28 Ala. 332 (1856); Flagg v. Bean, 25 N.H. 49 (1852);
Shortall v. Hinckley, supra note 132; Briggs v. Titus, 13 R.I. 136 (1880). See
Note, 56 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997, 999 (1915).
134. Lang v. Hitchcock, 99 Ill. 550 (1881); Robie v. Chapman, 59 N.H. 41
(1879); Mattocks v. Steams, 9 Vt. 326 (1837). See Notes, 23 L.R.A. 642, 648
(1894); 56 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997, 1000 (1915).
135. See I supra.
136. Teckenbrock v. McLaughlin, 246 Mo. 711, 152 S.W. 38 (1912); Hacken-
sack Trust Co. v. Tracy, 86 N.J. Eq. 301, 99 AtI. 846 (1917).
137. See notes 18 and 24, supra.
138. See notes 16, 18 and 24, supra.
139. The requisites for curtesy are discussed in I supra.
140. Cases are collected in Note, 56 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997, 1007 (1915). However,
the husband may release his right in the manner prescribed by the applicable statute.
See VII infra. In North Carolina, where the husband's "curtesy" is confined to lands
as to which his wife dies intestate, it has been held that the husband may convey
in the wife's lifetime what the court termed his "valuable interest." ColwelI v.
O'Brien, 198 N.C. 228, 151 S.E. 190 (1930), 8 N.C.L. REv. 476 (1930).
141. See text infra at notes 153 et seq.
142. See cases cited in notes 144, 145 and 148 infra. The husband's interest is
not subject to attachment or sale under execution during the wife's lifetime. Ball v.
Woolfolk, 175 Mo. 278, 75 S.W. 410 (1903); Hitz v. Nat. Metropolitan Bank, 111
U.S. 722 (1884).
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ordinarily have the interest set apart to him in his wife's lifetime,143 he
may be entitled under appropriate circumstances to injunctive or other
relief to prevent its destruction by the wife, her transferees or creditors.
The rule that the husband is entitled to have his inchoate interest
protected may be illustrated by a few examples. If during coverture
the wife conveys land without the husband's joinder or release, his
inchoate right is in no way affected. 44  A mortgage or lien acquired
on the property during coverture without his joinder does not affect
his right,4 5 unless the encumbrance is a purchase-money mortgage or
a vendor's lien.'" Similarly, in the absence of statute,147 his right can-
not be defeated by the wife's judgment creditors who levy execution
upon her property for a debt incurred after marriage, 48 or by an
adverse possession for the statutory period in her lifetime.' 49 Even in
the case of a mortgage or other lien which is superior to curtesy, the
husband frequently has a right to redeem from such a mortgage or
encumbrance; 'o and, if the mortgage is foreclosed during coverture.
he may in some states be given an interest in the surplus proceeds. 5 '
His right will also be protected from fraudulent schemes to destroy it:
for example, if, on the eve of marriage, a woman transfers land, without
the knowledge and consent of her husband-to-be and for the purpose of
143. In an occasional state, if the husband secures a divorce for the fault of the
wife, his interest is accelerated and he is entitled to have it assigned in the wife's
lifetime. OE. CoMP. LAWS ANN. (1940), § 9-912. Cf. MASS. GEN. LAws (1932),
c. 208, § 27 (Dower).
144. ILT. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 1 (1935); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 1A (1932);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4733 (1949); Farley v Stacey, 177 Ky. 109, 197 S.W. 636
(1917); Hackensack Trust Co. v. Tracy, 86 N.J. Eq. 301, 99 Atl. 846 (1917).
Contra, Scott v. Scott, 324 Mo. 1055, 26 S.W.2d 598 (1930). Further statutory
citations are collected in 3 VERNmR, AmFAx FAmY LAWS 563, 566 (1935).
An occasional state has made provision for barring the husband's interest with
compensation when the wife is under a contract to sell and he refuses to release his
interest. ML. REv. STAT. c. 156, § 19 (1944) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4101 (1949).
145. Wright v. Pell, 90 N.J. Eq. 11, 105 At. 20 (1918). See statutes referred
to in note 144 supra.
146. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 4 (1935); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 2
(1932) ; ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-104,-401 (1940).
147. Statutes in a few jurisdictions do not protect the husband's statutory in-
terest in lands sold on execution or judicial sale. IOWA CODE § 636.5 (1950) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §22-108 (1935); MINN. STAT. § 525.16(2) (Henderson, 1949);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943).
148. See text infra at notes 201 et seq.
149. Jones v. Coffey, 109 N.C. 515, 14 S.E. 84 (1891). This rule is a consequence
of the fact that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of an ad-
verse possessor until there is a right of action against him. See 1 RESTATEmENT
PROPERTY § 222 (1936). In Calvert v. Murphy, 73 W. Va. 731, 81 S.E. 403 (1914),
the statute of limitations ran against the wife during coverture, but it was held that
the husband was denied curtesy since she did not die seised of the property as then
required by W. VA. CoDE § 3663 (1913), since repealed. The husband's share now
attaches to land of which the wife was seised at any time during coverture. W. VA.
CoDE. ANN. § 4096 (1949).
150. See 2 Jo Es, MORTGAGES § 1366 (1928).
151. KY. REv. STAT. §§ 392.010-.040 (1948); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4098 (1949).
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defeating his curtesy, the conveyance will be set aside to the extent
necessary to preserve his right." 2
Several states have statutes which deny protection to the inchoate
right in special situations, such as in execution sales,153 or when the
husband is a nonresident. 54 Illinois provides that a mechanic's lien is
superior to the husband's right if he has knowledge of the improvements
and does not give written notice of his objection before they are made.'55
Generally, as in the case of dower, the purchaser at a partition sale takes
the land free of the claim of curtesy, 56 and the same is presumably true
of the state when it takes land by eminent domain. 57 In Maine and
West Virginia, if the wife is under contract to sell land and the husband
refuses to release his interest, that interest may be barred with com-
pensation by the court having jurisdiction of such matters. 5s In some
states, the purchaser at a tax sale may take free of curtesy.1
59
Except in the foregoing special situations, or when the interest
has been barred in some recognized manner, 6" the husband's inchoate
right is an encumbrance upon the wife's lands, and she cannot without
his joinder convey a clear title.16' The existence of that right is con-
sequently a source of substantial difficulty to the title examiner; it com-
plicates suits for specific performance by the wife's vendee; it is dis-
advantageous to judgment creditors; and it is a clog on the mar-
ketability of land.' 62 Since the husband is generally self-supporting, the
arguments for protecting his inchoate interest are less persuasive than
those for protecting the analogous interest of the wife, and this is par-
ticularly true when its protection results in defeating the claims of
honest creditors and in fettering the alienability of land.
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8366 (Williams, 1934) ; Tucker v. Andrews, 13 Me. 124
(1836); Logan v. Simmons, 38 N.C. 487 (1845); 1 WAsHrnuRN, REAL PROPERTY
155 (6th ed. 1902) and cases there cited.
153. IowA CODE § 636.5 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-108 (1935) ; MiNN.
STAT. § 525.16(2) (Henderson 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-101 (1943).
154. IowA CODE § 636.8 (1950) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943). See Decker,
Dower and Curtesy of Non-Resident Spouse, 1 Om. L. REv. 165 (1922).
155. Iii. ANN. STAT. c. 82, § 1 (1935).
156. See 3 VERNiER, AmERicaN FAmny LAWS 565-566 (1935). Apparently, in
most states he will have a protected interest in the proceeds. E.g., DEL. REv. CODE
§ 3750 (1935) ; IOWA CODE § 636.3 (1950) ; ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 9-626 (1940);
W. VA. CODE ANN. §4100 (1949). See 26 CoL L. REv. 1037-1038 (1926).
157. See analogous cases relating to dower in Note, 5 A.L.R. 1347 (1920) ; 80
U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 749 (1932).
158. ME. REv. STAT. c. 156, § 19 (1944) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4101 (1949).
159. N.J. P-v. STAT. §54:6-1 (1937). See Note, 75 A.L.R. 416, 430 (1931).
160. See generally VII infra.
161. See text infra at notes 180 et seq.
162. Kennedy v. Koopman, 166 Mo. 87, 65 S.W. 1020 (1901).
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VII. BARRING CURTESY
When the husband's inchoate interest-whether curtesy or a statu-
tory substitute therefor-has attached to the wife's land, it cannot be
defeated except for certain defined and limited causes and in certain
definite ways. As already explained,' his interest is subject in most
situations to the same defects and limitations existing in the wife's
estate at the time his interest attached, but except in those situations
it cannot generally be defeated without his consent. 64  In many states,
however, there are statutory provisions which may be invoked to bar
curtesy in special situations. Thus, in some states the wife may con-
vey her land free of curtesy if the husband is a nonresident of the state
where the land is situated.'65 In two states provision is made for the
compulsory extinguishment of curtesy in the case of a sale of land in
which the husband has refused to join in the deed," 8 or in the case of
a suit for specific performance brought by a vendee under a contract
of sale made by the wife.' 67  Other situations are treated in detail
below.'68
Curtesy or its statutory equivalent is of course barred when ex-
pressly abolished by legislative provision.'( 9 Usually in states where
curtesy or similar statutory share has been abolished there is substituted
a scheme of statutory heirship which has none of the characteristics of
curtesy as herein discussed. Generally, in such jurisdictions, a wife
may defeat her husband's forced share to the extent that she conveys
away her property in her lifetime and relinquishes all control thereof,
but that share is nevertheless protected against her testamentary disposi-
tions. 70 In some states a scheme of forced heirship may exist side by
163. See IV supra.
164. In Missouri, the Married Women's Act has been construed to permit the
wife to defeat her husband's inchoate interest by her sole deed. Scott v. Scott, 324
Mo. 1055, 26 S.W.2d 598 (1930). In some cases curtesy will be barred on a theory
of estoppel if the husband's acts or conduct are inconsistent with his claim. Heisen
v. Heisen, 145 Ill. 658, 34 N.E. 597 (1893); Dooley v. Merrill, 216 Mass. 500, 104
N.E. 345 (1914).
165. IOWA CODE § 636.8 (1950); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943).
166. Mr& REV. STAT. c. 156, § 19 (1944) ; .W. VA. CoDE ANr. § 4100 (1949).
167. W. VA. CODE AmT. § 4101 (1949).
168. Reference should also be made to the fact that curtesy may be barred by
partition or condemnation proceedings, notes 156 and 157 rupra, or by tax sale, note
159 spra.
169. Difficult constitutional questions can arise if the statute abolishing curtesy
is in any degree retroactive. If the parties are married and the land is acquired
after the effective date of the statute, the statute is valid. But if the time of mar-
riage and of the acquisition of the land precede the effective date, it becomes neces-
sary to determine whether the husband's interest is so "vested" as to be indestructible.
Compare Duncan v. Duncan, 324 Mo. 167, 23 S.W.2d 91 (1929), and Scaife v.
McKee, 298 Pa. 33, 148 At. 37 (1929), with Schmidt v. Gardner, 120 N.J. Eq. 235,
184 At. 624 (1936).
170. Statutory provisions are summarized in 3 VERNmR, AmmuCAx FAmIY
LAws 416-422 (1935).
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side with curtesy. In such states the husband is put to an election be-
tween the two at her death, and his choice of the statutory share will
effectively bar his curtesy.17'
By Contract or Settlement. Statutes offering a means of barring
curtesy by antenuptial settlement are available in several states." 2
Under such statutes curtesy is barred by a settlement on an intended
husband, if made with his consent, or by any pecuniary provision made
for his benefit in lieu of curtesy and with his assent. As Vernier
states,173 those statutes are fragmentary and antiquated in character
and are probably seldom utilized today. More commonly used are
antenuptial agreements whereby parties intending marriage contract
with respect to the share that each is to have in the property of the
other. Such a contract, if fair and entered into without imposition, will
effectively bar the husband's right of curtesy.' 4 Similarly, in most
states, the husband may bar his interest by contracting with his wife
during marriage. At common law such contracts were invalid because
of the incapacity of married persons to contract inter Se. Although
today there is little express legislative authorization for such con-
tracts, 1 75 they are nevertheless effective to bar curtesy in most states, 1 7
if entered into without imposition and supported by adequate considera-
tion.1 77 A common example of such contracts are those found in separa-
tion agreements. If the agreement is valid, it is effective to bar the hus-
band's curtesy if it contains an express statement to that effect.1'7
In several states it is provided that, if the husband is lawfully
evicted from lands settled on him by jointure or other provision, he is
entitled to a share in his wife's property as if such jointure or provision
had not been made.'7  The effect of such legislation is therefore to
171. VIII infra.
172. E.g., ILL ANN. STAT. "c. 41, § 7 (1935) ; MASS. GsN. LAws c. 189, §§ 7,8
(1932); Mo. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 334 (1939) ; OR. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-109,-11,
-401 (1940); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4102 (1949).
173. 3 VERNIE, AmEICAN FAMILY LAws 561 (1935).
174. King v. King, 184 Mo. 99, 82 S.W. 101 (1904) ; Gilmore v. Burch, 7 Ore.
374 (1879). See McGee v. McGee, 91 Ill. 548 (1879) (wife's dower).
175. See 3 VERNm, AMERICAN FAmiLY LAWS 561 (1935).
176. Cases are collected in Note, 49 A.L.R. 116 (1927). In some states such
contracts are expressly forbidden. IowA CoDE § 597.2 (1950) ; MINN. STAT. § 519.06
(Henderson, 1949) ; ORE. COmp. LAWS ANN. § 63-205 (1940). In a few other states,
contracts between husband and wife are not permitted. 3 VERNmR, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 65-71 (1935).
177. Crum v. Sawyer, 132 Ill. 443, 24 N.E. 956 (1890); In re Lauderback's
Estate, 106 Neb. 461, 184 N.W. 128 (1921).
178. Luttrell v. Boggs, 168 Ill. 361, 48 N.E. 171 (1897) ; McBreen v. McBreen,
154 Mo. 323, 55 S.W. 463 (1900).
179. E.g., Ky. Ray. STAT. J§ 392.010,-.120 (1948); MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 189,
9 15 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 319, 336 (1939); OaE. ComB. LAws ANN.
§§ 17-115,-401 (1940) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4104 (1949).
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revive the husband's right of curtesy at the time of eviction from land
settled on him.
By Deed or Release. At common law, marriage incapacitated the
wife to convey her lands without her husband's joinder, but that in-
capacity has been largely removed in the United States as a result of
the so-called Married Women's Acts and similar legislation permitting
a married woman to convey or dispose of her property as if sole. 8 '
However, the scope of such statutes removing the wife's incapacity is
limited by the existence of a contingent right by way of curtesy exist-
ing in the husband during marriage."18 In nearly all states recognizing
such a contingent right,ea the wife cannot, by her sole deed, defeat
that interest once it has attached. If the husband releases his interest
in the manner permitted by the applicable statute, his right to curtesy is
extinguished.'83 The specific requirements for the execution of a valid
release vary widely from state to state, and it is not profitable to detail
them." 4 Suffice it to say that in all American jurisdictions recognizing
inchoate curtesy or a similarly protected interest during coverture a
husband can bar that interest by joinder with his wife in her deed or,
mortgage.' 5
.In certain situations the wife may convey full title without the
joinder of her husband, notably in cases where the inchoate right has
been barred at the time the deed is executed.' 8 The same is true by
statute in other situations, as when he has abandoned her,8 7 or when
he has been declared judicially dead after an absence of seven years. 18
In several states by statute the husband's inchoate right is barred with-
out his joinder in lands sold on execution or under a "judicial" sale.'8 9
Nearly everywhere a mortgage given by the wife to secure the purchase
price of land will bar the husband's curtesy without his joinder. 90
180. See, generally, 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 293-316 (1935).
181. See VI supra.
182. Cases are collected in Note, 14 A.L.R. 355, 358 (1921).
183. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 1 (1935); Ky. REv. STAT. § 404.030(1)
(1948); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, §lA (1932); ORE. Coal?. LAWS ANN.
§§ 17-108,-401 (1940). The husband may of course bind himself to release his interest
by joining in his wife's contract to convey. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4101 (1949).
184. These statutory provisions are classified in 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY
LAWS 563 (1935). 0
185. Problems arising in connection with the release of the inchoate interest are
discussed in 3 VERNIER, AiMICAN FAMILY LAWS 562-563, 566 (1935).
186. For example, if the husband has joined in the wife's contract to convey.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4101 (1949).
187. E.g., N.H. REv. LAWS c. 359, § 18 (1942) ; MASS. GEN. LAws c. 209, § 35
(1932).
188. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3:45-5 (Supp. 1949).
189. IOWA CODE § 636.8 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §22-108 (1935) ; MINN.
STAT. § 525.16(2) (Henderson, 1949); NaB. REv. STAT. § 30-101 (1943).
190. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 4 (1935); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 2
(1932); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-104,-401 (1940).
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By Will. In states where the husband has a protected expectancy
in the wife's lands during the marriage she cannot usually defeat that
expectancy by her will, 9 ' despite the Married Women's Acts empower-
ing her to dispose of her property as if sole. 9 ' In a few states she may
bar the husband's curtesy by will if the local "statute confines his interest
to lands of which she is seised at death.'3
As in the corresponding case of dower, if the wife makes a testa-
mentary provision in favor of the husband which is intended to be in
lieu of curtesy, he is put to an election between that and the interest
to which he is entitled by way of curtesy."' His election to take the
testamentary provision will then effectively bar his curtesy' 95 In
most jurisdictions a testamentary provision is presumed to be in lieu
of curtesy unless a contrary intention appears in the instrument.9
Only when it clearly appears on the face of the will that the testamentary,
provision was intended to be in addition to curtesy will he be permitted
to claim both. 97 Usually, when the husband is required to elect and
he fails to do so, the law will make the election for him, 98 so that in
most jurisdictions he must take affirmative action if he wishes to take
his curtesy interest. The time and manner of election is generally
closely specified by statute 9 9 and close compliance therewith is
essential. 00
By Appropriation for Wife's Debts. At common law, because of
the general disability of a married woman to contract obligations dur-
191. Shoup v. Shoup, 319 Ill. 179, 149 N.E. 746 (1925) ; Casler v. Gray, 159 Mo.
588, 60 S.W. 1032 (1901); Schaffler v. Handwerker, 152 Tenn. 329, 278 S.W. 967
(1925). Statutory provisions are summarized in 3 VERNIER, AmERCAN FAMILY
LAWS 538-553 (1935). In three jurisdictions purporting to retain curtesy, the wife
has power to defeat the husband's interest by will. D.C. CODE § 18-215 (1940) ; N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-16 (1950); Wis. STAT. § 23323 (1947).
192. See Note, 29 A.L.R. 1338 (1924).
193. D.C. CODE § 18-215 (1940); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-16 (1950); Wis.
STAT. §233.23 (1947).
194. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 41, § 10 (1935); Ky. Rv. STAT. §§ 392.010,-.080 (2)
(1948); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 191, § 17 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 319, 332
(1939); ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-113,-401 (1940).
195. Stubblefield v. Howard, 348 Ill. 20, 180 N.E. 410 (1932); Smith v. Hyett,
131 Ore. 1, 281 Pac. 826 (1929). See statutory provisions cited in note 194 supra.
196. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 10 (1935) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 191, § 17
(1932) ; ORE. ComP. LAws ANN. §§ 17-113,-401 (1940). In a few states, no legisla-
tion to this effect exists, so that by analogy to the common law of dower the presump-
tion would be that the husband might have both curtesy and the testamentary pro-
vision. Voss v. Stortz, 177 Ky. 541,. 197 S.W. P64 (1917).
197. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 392.010,-.080(2) (1948) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 191,
§17 (1932).
198. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 10 (1935); Opx. Coup. LAWS ANN.
§§ 17-114,-401 (1940).
199. See statutes cited in note 194 mtpra.
200. In a large number of states the same statutes control the election of both
widower and widow. These statutes are collected in 3 VERNIER, AmmucAN FAMILY
LAWS 559 (1935).
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ing coverture, the problem of whether or not her debts took precedence
over the husband's right of curtesy was not likely to arise. Today,
however, the problem has considerable significance because of the wife's
power to incur debts. Few states deal with the matter by statute,201
and where the question has arisen in the absence thereof it has usually
been held, by analogy to dower, that the husband's curtesy cannot be
defeated by his wife's creditors either during coverture or after her
death.20 2  However, a mortgage or similar lien which attached to the
wife's land before marriage or which was given during coverture to
secure the purchase price of land is superior to curtesy and may be
enforced against the land to the extent necessary to satisfy the debt." 3
Legislation in several states has altered the foregoing in certain
special situations. In Maine, for example, an assignee for the benefit
of creditors, or one holding title by levy of sale or execution, may
bring an action to have the husband's interest divested with compensa-
tion.204 In Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota and Nebraska the husband is not
entitled to a statutory share in lands sold on execution or judicial sale.205
An Illinois statute provides that a mechanic's lien is superior to the
husband's interest if he knew of the improvements and did not give
written notice of his objection thereto before they were made.
2 1 If
the husband's interest in his wife's realty is confined to the interest of
which she died seised or owning,2 7 that interest is nearly always sub-
ordinate to the claims of his wife's creditors.2 8
By Misconduct. In the absence of statute, misconduct on the part
of the husband does not deprive him of curtesy,"° unless his misconduct
results in a divorce which terminates the marriage relationship.2 10 By
201. See statutes cited in notes 204-206 infra.
202. Myers v. Hansborough, 202 Mo. 495, 100 S.W. 1137 (1907); Browne v.
Bockover, 84 Va. 424, 4 S.E. 745 (1888); Gilkison v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 549, 91
S.E. 395 (1917). In Indiana, the husband's interest has been held to be subject
only to the wife's antenuptial debts. Kemph v. Belknap, 15 Ind. App. 77, 43 N.E.
891 (1895). As to whether or not curtesy is an asset in bankruptcy, see Note, 48
A.L.R. 784, 793 (1927) ; Salcer, Dower and Curtesy Rights in Bankruptcy, 53 Com.
L.J. 65 (1948).
203. E.g., ILL ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 3, 4 (1935); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN.
§§ 17-103,-104,-401 (1940).
204. Mn. RFv. STAT. c. 156, § 19 (1944).
205. IoxvA CoDE § 636.5 (1950) ; KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22.108 (1935) ; MiN .
STAT. §525.16(2) (Henderson, 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §30-105 (1943).
206. ILT. ANN. STAT. c. 82, § 1 (1935).
207. E.g., D.C. CoDE § 18-215 (1940); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-16 (1943);
Wis. STAT. § 233.23 (1947).
208. Stewart v. Ross, 50 Miss. 776 (1874) ; Miller v. Hanna, 89 Neb. 224, 131
N.W. 226 (1911).
209. Wells v. Thompson, 13 Ala. 793 (1848). See Note, 71 A.L.R. 277, 282, 285
(1931).
210. The effect of divorce is considered infra.
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statute, however, various forms of misconduct, such as, adultery,
211
desertion or abandonment of the wife,212 neglect or refusal to provide
for her,1 will bar the husband of curtesy. Although only an occa-
sional statute bars the husband of curtesy for the felonious killing of his
wife,214 most states have statutes which deprive a murderer of all rights
in his victim's property and which in most cases are sufficiently broad
to exclude the husband from curtesy under those circumstances. 215
Legislation dealing with the effect of misconduct is on the whole
fragmentary,20 and it is clear that no well-defined policy has been
formulated. There is a real need for legislation permitting a wife to
convey her lands free of curtesy when she has been deserted or is living
apart with sufficient cause. 1
By Divorce. As a general rule, an absolute divorce bars curtesy
since it terminates the marriage relationship before the expectancy has
matured or the right has accrued.218 Several states, however, have
statutes which make the element of fault a consideration and expressly
preserve curtesy in cases where the husband secures the divorce because
of the wife's misconduct.2 19 Under such circumstances, the husband's
right attaches to lands of which the wife was seised during coverture but
not to lands acquired after the decree is granted. In an occasional state,
this rule takes the form of accelerating the husband's inchoate interest
.so that he is entitled to have his estate assigned upon the granting of
the decree as if the wife were dead.22' As in the case of dower, an
22121interlocutory decree, or one fraudulently obtained, 2  or void for lack
211. IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 15 (1935); Ky. REv. STAT. § 392.090 (1948);
Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 337 (1939) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4114 (1949).
212. MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 209, § 35 (1932); MINN. STAT. § 519.07 (Henderson
1949) ; N.H. REV. LAWS c. 359, § 18 (1942) ; W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4114 (1949).
213. N.H. REv. STAT. C. 359, § 18 (1942).
214. E.g., IowA CODE § 636.47 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-19 (1950).
215. Note, 71 A.L.R. 277, 288-290 (1931).
216. Such statutes have usually been strictly construed. Cf. Landreth v. Casey,
340 Ill. 519, 173 N.E. 84 (1930).
217. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 568 (1935).
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-19 (1950) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4718 (1949);
Boykin v. Rain, 28 Ala. 332 (1856); Doyle v. Rolwing, 165 Mo. 231, 65 S.W. 315
(1901) ; Jones v. Kirby, 146 Va. 109, 135 S.E. 676 (1926). As to the effect of divorce
on marriage settlements, see Note, 95 A.L.R. 1469 (1935).
219. E.g., ILl. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 14 (1935); R.I. GEN. LAws c. 416, § 6
(1938); W. VA. CODE ANN. §4718 (1949).
220. R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 416, § 6 (1938) ; MASS. GEN. LAws c. 208, § 27 (1932) ;
ORE. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 9-912 (1940). Cf. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4718 (1949).
221. Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.050 (1948); R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 416, § 8 (1938);
Tierney v. Tierney, 50 R.I. 105, 145 Ati. 444 (1929). See Note, 76 A.L.R. 284
(1932).
222. Dennis v. Harris, 179 Iowa 121, 153 N.W. 343 (1915) (wife's dower). See
Harper, The Effect of a Foreign Divorce Upon Dower, 26 Im L, REv. 397, 399
(1931).
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of jurisdiction, w= will not bar curtesy. Since a marriage is not ter-
minated by a divorce a mensa et thoro, curtesy will not be barred
thereby.Y2
VIII. ELECTION OF STATUTORY SHARE
In a large number of American jurisdictions the husband is entitled
upon the death of his wife to a statutory share of her property which
has none of the characteristics of curtesy but which is very frequently
the share of real and personal property to which he would be entitled
if she died intestate. 25 Usually, such a scheme is found in states (other
than community property states) which have abolished all vestiges of
curtesy, but in a few states it exists along with curtesy as an alternative
which the husband may elect upon his wife's death. 2 The statutory
provisions in these states differ considerably, but it may be said that,
unless the husband has been barred of his right in some manner, his
choices are generally three: (1) he may elect to take the interest, if any,
which his wife gives him by will; (2) he may renounce such testamen-
tary provision and take the statutory forced share; or (3) he may re-
nounce both the testamentary provision and the statutory share and
take curtesy.2 7 In states where the husband has such a three-fold elec-
tion, if the wife makes a provision for the husband in her will, he must
take affirmative action if he wishes to renounce the will and claim either
curtesy or his statutory share. 28 The mode of election and the time
within which it must be made are generally specified in considerable
detail, and the requirements must be closely complied with. 9 If the
wife makes no provision for the husband in her will, he may elect be-
tween curtesy and the statutory share. He is ordinarily not entitled to
both, 23 0 and his failure to elect will usually be construed as an election to
take the statutory share rather than curtesy.2' Beyond the foregoing,
223. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 395 (3rd ed. 1949).
224. Hartigan v. Hartigan, 65 W. Va. 471, 64 S.E. 726 (1909). Cases are col-
lected in Note, 17 ANN. CAS. 730 (1910).
For problems, relating to foreign divorce, see Wheeler, Effect of Foreign Divorce
on Dower and Curtesy, 25 MicH. L. RPv. 487 (1927).
225. For a summary of such jurisdictions, see 3 VERNIER, AmRCAN FAMILY
LAWS 535-536, 538-553 (1935).
226. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, §§ 10, 12 (1935) ; MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 46,
§ 4 (1939) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 1; c. 191, § 15 (1932) ; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§319, 328, 329 (1939); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 359, § 13 (1942).
227. For this triple election, see NEWHAL, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND
FiDUCrARY LAW IN MASSACHUSETTs cc. 19-21 (3d ed. 1937).
228. See statutory provisions cited in note 226 supka.
229. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, §§ 12, 13 (1935).
230. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 3, §§ 162, 171 (1935) ; MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 189,
§ 1; c. 190, § 1 (1932).
231. IL, ANN. STAT. c. 3, § 171 (1935); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 46,
§ 4 (1939) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 189, § 1; c. 190, § 1 (1932).
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generalization is unsafe because of variations in statutory language, and
local statutes should therefore be consulted.
If the husband is entitled to choose among the three alternatives,
it may often be difficult to advise him which of the three he should
take. Clearly, the nature and provisions of the will, the kind and
amount of the assets of the estate, together with the husband's personal
circumstances, are among the important factors. There are several
further factors, in addition to possible personal preferences, which may
affect the husband's choice. For example, the statutory share is nearly
always an absolute one, whereas curtesy, unless enlarged by statute, is
an estate for life only. Moreover, the statutory share is nearly always
subject to creditors' claims, whereas curtesy generally is not, so that
the extent of such claims or charges will have to be considered. Since
the statutory share frequently includes personalty as well as realty, the
character of the wife's estate will also affect the husband's choice, and
there may be considerations of estate and income taxes to be kept in
mind., 2 Further generalization is unprofitable and might be mislead-
ing. Probably. under most circumstances it will be unwise for the
husband to claim curtesy unless the wife owned considerable real estate
and died insolvent or so nearly so that the bulk of the realty must be
sold to pay debts and expenses, or unless the wife conveyed during her
lifetime substantial amounts of realty without procuring from the-hus-
band a release of his protected interest. Probably, today, that situation
will rarely arise. m3
IX. THE INTEREST AFTER WIFE'S DEATH
At common law, if the requisites of marriage, seisin and birth of
issue had been complied with, the husband acquired the present life
estate known as "curtesy initiate" in his wife's inheritable lands. That
interest was said to become "consummate" upon her death if he sur-
vived her.2" 4 Since for nearly all purposes there was no important
difference between the incidents of the estates of curtesy initiate and
curtesy consummate," 5 the wife's death added little or nothing to the
rights and powers which he already had in her lands." No assignment
232. Cases involving the taxability of the husband's interest' are collected in
Notes, 1916C, L.R.A. 675, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 428 (1911). See also CCH Ixir.,
EsT. & Gnr TAx Smav. 111 3400-3405.
233. Cf. NEWHALI, SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES AND FiDucIARY LAW IN MASSA-
CHusarrs 449 (3rd ed. 1937).
234. Co. LITT. *30a.
235. See note 4 supra.
236. During the wife's lifetime his interest was subject to being defeated by
divorce. See Mattocks v. Steams, 9 Vt. 326 (1837).
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of the consummate interest was necessary, as in the case of the widow's
dower, since the husband's estate extended to all, rather than a fraction,
of the lands of which his wife had had the requisite seisin.2 7
As emphasized elsewhere in this article, curtesy initiate as a present
estate has been done away with in the United States, either indirectly
as a result of the so-called Married Women's Acts, 23s or directly as a
result of statutes abolishing all vestiges of curtesy.D In jurisdictions
which still retain curtesy in some form after the wife's death, the hus-
band generally has during marriage a protected expectancy which is
similar to inchoate dower and which arises when the requisites of cur-
tesy have been complied with.2" If the expectancy is not barred in
some manner during coverture, it matures upon the wife's death and
loses its contingent character. At that time the husband is entitled
either to possession of the lands subject to curtesy or to have his rights
therein ascertained and set off in an appropriate action. Because of
the modifications of common law curtesy which have taken place in
most states, some procedure analogous to assignment of dower is neces-
sary in order to set off the husband's share,241 and in most of those
states the statutes governing the assignment of dower are applicable
to the assignment of the husband's share.42 It should be noted that
the husband is generally not entitled to an interest analogous to the
widow's quarantine pending the assignment of his estate.2 43  However,
under a statute providing that the law of dower is applicable to the law
of curtesy it has been held that the husband may occupy the mansion
house and curtilage until his curtesy has been assigned,244 and it may
therefore be that in the few states having similar statutes the husband
has a right similar to quarantine.
2 45
237. See 1 CRUISE, REAL PR OPERTY 167 (Greenleaf ed. 1856).
238. Cases involving the effect of these statutes are colle.ted in Notes, 14 A.L.R.
355 (1921), 29 id. 1338 (1924).
239. See 3 VEmnRn, AmEmCAN FAmmIy LAws 538-553 (1935).
240. See note 14 smpra.
241. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 41, § 18 (1935); Ky. Civ. CODE ANN. § 499 (Carroll,
1948) ; NJ. REv. STAT. §§ 3:38-1 et seq. (1937) ; W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4107 (1949).
See, generally, 3 VERNmIR, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS 572 (1935).
242. No provisions relating to assignment are found in four states-Delaware,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Tennessee-which still recognize curtesy con-
summate essentially as at common law.
243. Huffman v. Huffman, 57 Ohio App. 33, 11 N.E.2d 271 (1937). Since at
common law the husband's curtesy interest was a present estate in the wife's lifetime
and no assignment was necessary upon her death, there was no need to make pro-
vision for him pending assignment.
244. Amiss v. Hiteshew, 106 W. Va. 703, 147 S.E. 26 (1929). See also NJ.
REv. STAT. § 3:37-4 (1937).
245. See, e.g., Mo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 319 (1939); Omn. ComP. LAws ANN.
§§ 17-118,401 (1940).
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When curtesy has been assigned or otherwise set apart to the hus-
band, he has an immediate freehold estate in the lands so set apart.
In most jurisdictions his interest therein is a life estate,246 and in gen-
eral all the incidents of a life estate attach to his tenancy.247 He is en-
titled to the rents and profits like any life tenant. 4 s and can maintain
trespass or ejectment to protect his interest.249  Easements and other
rights appurtenant to the land pass with it,25° and the husband takes
subject to defects in his wife's title and to paramount encumbrances.
251
He may freely transfer or encumber the property to the extent of his
interest," but he may not commit waste.253  The interest may be sold
on execution for his debts. 54  In most jurisdictions he is under a duty
to make repairs in order to prevent the deterioration of the improve-
ments on the land,255 and he is liable for taxes assessed against the
property.256 Although the widower will not forfeit his estate for
crime,2 7 he may be deprived of it in some states for committing
waste 25 s or for failure to pay taxes.29  In several states if the husband
246. See summary of statutes in 3 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAMLY LAWS 538-551,
553-555 (1935).
247. 1 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERY 160 (6th ed. 1902).
248. Decker v. Decker, 205 Ky. 69, 265 S.W. 483 (1924); Miller v. Proctor,
330 Mo. 43, 49 S.W.2d 84 (1932).
249. Costello v. Grand Trunk Railway, 70 N.H. 403, 47 Atl. 265 (1900). The
husband is usually held to have an insurable interest in the premises. Cases are col-
lected in Note, 68 A.L.R. 362, 365 (1930).
250. RoPER, HUSBAND AND WIFE *35.
251. See III and IV supra.
252. Scott v. Cheatham, 199 Ark. 827, 136 S.W.2d 483 (1940); Perkins v.
Anderson, 292 Mass. 377, 198 N.E. 606 (1935) ; Hussey v. Kidd, 209 N.C. 232, 183
S.E. 355 (1936).
253. DET. REv. CODE § 3788 (1935); IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 45 (1935); ORE.
COmP. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-117,-401 (1940) ; Wis. STAT. § 279.02 (1947). Armstrong
v. Wilson, 60 Ill. 226 (1871).; Learned v. Ogden, 80 Miss. 769, 32 So. 278 (1902).
See Ware v. Ware, 6 N.J. Eq. 117 (1847). Similarly, a tenant by the curtesy may
not authorize another to commit waste. McLeod v. Dial, 63 Ark. 10, 37 S.W. 306
(1896); Potomac Co. v. Smoot, 108 Md. 54, 69 Atl. 507 (1908).
254. Stanley v. Bonham, 52 Ark. 354, 12 S.W. 706 (1889); Deming v. Miles,
35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665 (1892) ; McCaskill v. McCormac, 99 N.C. 548, 6 S.E. 423
(1888) ; First Nat. Bank of Northfork v. Godfrey, 94 W. Va. 1, 117 S.E. 680 (1923).
255. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 45 (1935) ; ORE. COmP. LAWs ANN. § 17-117,-401
(1940). In re Steele, 19 N.J. Eq. 120 (1868). Assessments for permanent improve-
ments are usually apportioned ratably between the life tenant and the reversioner.
Hicks v. Norsworthy, 176 Ark. 786, 4 S.W.2d 897 (1928).
256. Hicks v. Norsworthy, supra note 255; White v. Town of Portland, 67 Conn.
272 (1896) ; King v. King, 9 Jones & S. 516 (N.Y. 1877).
257. IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 16 (1935); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§319, 330
(1939).
258. E.g., IL. ANN. STAT. c. 41, § 45 (1935); MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 242, § 1
(1932); N.J. REv. STAT. §2:79-3 (1937).
259. OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 5688 (1938).
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is lawfully evicted from the lands assigned him, he will be entitled to a
new assignment or to other compensation."' When he dies, the land
devolves on the person or persons owning the reversion, and all the
incidents of his estate then terminate. 6' Crops growing on the land,
however, pass with his personal estate. 62
In jurisdictions where the husband is entitled to an absolute in-
terest in his wife's lands by way of curtesy,2" he is entitled to the en-
joyment of all the incidents appurtenant to such an interest, and on his
death the property will pass to those entitled to take under his will or
under the applicable intestate laws.
260. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS C. 189, § 15 (1932); ORE. Comp. LAws ANN.
§§ 17-115,401 (1940).
261. But see Symmes v. Drew, 21 Pick. 278 (Mass. 1838) (easement appurtenant
to land assigned as dower held to continue after wife's death).
262. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 4112 (1949) ; 3 VERN=, AmERICAN FAmY LAWS
573-574 (1935).
263. See 3 id. at 538-553.
